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An Analysis of Airport Pricing and Regulation in the Presence  of  Competition Between Full 
Service Airlines and Low Cost Carriers 
 
Tae Hoon Oum, Xiaowen Fu*, and Mark Lijesen 
Abstract 
Despite the airport privatization and deregulation trend in recent years, whether or not the 
privatized or commercialized airports should be left unregulated is still an open question.  
Related to this issue, one question that has received a very  little attention to date is if and 
how pricing behavior of unregulated airports affect downstream airline competition, 
especially the competition between airlines offering differentiated services such as the case 
of full service airlines (FSA) vis-à-vis low cost carriers (LCC).  If the upstream monopoly 
(airport) hinders downstream (airline) competition, the welfare effects of the upstream 
unregulated monopoly may be much larger than initially suspected.  This aspect of airport 
pricing has not been formally incorporated in the debate on airport price regulation. 
 
In this paper, we study a duopoly model to capture the differential competitive effects of 
changing airport user charges on FSAs and LCCs.  By making reasonable assumptions on 
differential price elasticities, unit costs and competitive behavior as manifested by firm-
specific conduct parameters, we perform numerical simulations to measure differential 
effects on an FSA and an LCC of increasing airside user charge by an unregulated upstream 
monopolist airport. 
 
Our analytical and numerical results suggest existence of the asymmetric effects of an 
airport’s monopoly pricing on LCC and FSA.  That is, LCCs suffer more from an identical 
cost increase than FSAs and are, therefore, more vulnerable to monopolistic pricing practices 
of an unregulated airport.  This implies that unregulated airport pricing would reduce the 
extent of competition in downstream airline markets, and thus, cause a further detrimental 
effect on welfare over and above the first-order dead weight loss of airport’s monopolistic 
pricing.  Considering that LCCs have brought considerable reduction of average fares and the 
associated welfare gains, it is important for the governments to take into account of these 
asymmetric effects of increasing airport user charges on FSAs and LCCs when they consider 
the form and extent of regulation or deregulation. 
 
Although our model and simulation work deal specifically with the effect of airport pricing 
on downstream airline markets, our framework of analysis may be applicable to analysis of 
any policy affecting costs of  FSAs and LCCs including security levies as well as potentially 
adaptable to other upstream-downstream industry cases. 
 
  
  2An Analysis of Airport Pricing and Regulation in the Presence  of  Competition 
Between Full Service Airlines and Low Cost Carriers 
 
Tae Hoon Oum, Xiaowen Fu, and Mark Lijesen 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The competitive effects of input price increases form an important research and policy topic 
for two reasons. First, lacking upstream competition may influence downstream 
competitiveness and reduce welfare. Secondly, markets with volatile input prices may be 
prone to effects on downstream competitiveness as well.  Both features are clearly present in 
aviation, where airports with market power provide indispensable inputs to airlines. 
 
This subject is primarily important for the regulation of privatized airports. Starting with the 
privatization of the three airports in the London area (Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted) and 
four other airports in the UK to BAA plc. in 1987, many airports around the world have 
already been or are in the process of being privatized.  The majority stakes of Copenhagen 
Kastrup International Airport, Vienna International Airport and Rome’s Leonardo Da Vinci 
Airport have been sold to private owners.  Many other European airports are in the process of 
being privatized. Auckland International Airport and Wellington International Airport in 
New Zealand and a large number of major Australian airports have been privatized as well.  
South Africa, Argentina, Mexico and many Asian countries including Japan are also 
considering privatizing their airports.
1   Canada is currently reviewing the regulatory 
oversight issues on its local airport authorities which were set up as not-for-profit 
corporations to manage major airports.  
 
Since the late 1990s economists have been arguing whether privatized airports need to be 
regulated in the first place.  Studies on country-specific options and experiences on this issue 
include Forsyth (1997, 2002a, b), Beesley (1999), Starkie and Yarrow (2000), and Starkie 
(2001).  In particular, Beesley (1999) argues that the price-cap regulation is inappropriate, 
particularly in the case of London’s Heathrow.  Starkie (2001) further concludes that ex-ante 
regulation for airports might be unnecessary because the airports are unlikely to abuse their 
monopoly power due to the existence of complementarity between the demand for aviation 
services and the demand for concession and other commercial services (concession).
2   
 
Indeed, some countries have moved towards a situation in which there is no formal price 
regulation but only monitoring of privatized airports (Forsyth, 2002b).  For example, New 
Zealand does not impose formal price regulation of its privatized airports.  Instead, since 
1988, Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington airports have been subject to “light-handed” 
regulation which requires airport to disclose contractual terms, financial reports and 
performance measures.  In Australia, primarily based on recommendation of the Productivity 
Commission (2001), on 1 July, 2002 the government ended the price-cap regulation from all 
privatized airports for a period of five years.
3  Towards the end of the five-year test period an 
                                                 
1 See Hooper (2002) for the list of Asian airports that are being considered for privatization. 
2 Besides ex-ante regulation (ROR, price-cap), there is also ex-post regulation (conduct regulation).  It is important 
to point out that those economists who argue for deregulation usually have the former in mind and are not 
proposing that conduct regulation be abolished also.   
3 At the same time, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer directed the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) to undertake formal monitoring of prices, costs and profits (Price Monitoring) 
  3independent review will be conducted in order to decide whether or not some sort of price 
regulation on the airports need to be re-established.    
  
There are some evidences to suggest that the airports attempted to raise prices after 
deregulation, and interested parties have had considerable concerns that airports may abuse 
their market power. Three regulatory reviews were conducted in New Zealand after the 1988 
deregulation, the last of which started in May 1998 and took five years to finish.  In Australia, 
Virgin Blue applied to the Australian Competition Tribunal to declare airside services at the 
Sydney Airport as commercial services to be treated according to the Trade Practices Act of 
Australia.  The Declaration of the airside services at the Sydney Airport under the TPA 
would force the Sydney Airport’s management to negotiate with the airlines before setting 
new fees or changing existing level of fees including aircraft landing charges.  In case there 
is a major disagreement between the airport and the airlines, then the matter is referred to a 
binding arbitration by ACCC.  Virgin Blue, a major LCC in Australia, believes that Sydney 
Airport under the current system has the ability and incentive to increase airside service 
charges substantially, and thus harm its ability to compete.  Interestingly, Virgin Blue’s 
major competitor, Qantas Airlines, supported the Declaration Application.  
 
The subject of the research treated in this paper has been motivated by our involvement in the 
Virgin Blue vs. Sydney Airport case before the Australian Competition Tribunal.   In this 
paper reports some analytical results we obtained during our investigation for the case.  In 
particular, we analyze how an increase in airport charge would affect the downstream airline 
competition, especially when airlines offer differentiated products (services) in the market 
place.  A duopoly model with differentiated products is used to obtain analytical results.  Due 
to strict confidentiality restrictions on the rich data to which we had access to, we are not able 
to report empirical results from real market data.  Instead, a numerical example and 
sensitivity tests are used to simulate the differential effects of an identical increase in airside 
services prices (mainly aircraft landing fees) on FSAs and LCCs.  
 
Although we focus our analysis on air transport industry, our approach to analysis is likely to 
have a wider application to other industries and markets.  Other network-oriented industries 
such as other transport modes and electric power firms  face a limited upstream competition 
due to the natural monopoly nature of most networks.  Transport and energy sectors are also 
characterized by volatile input prices.  The Third Party Access pricing has been an important 
research topic in some network sectors, notably in telecommunication and energy networks 
 
Third party access (TPA) to the network is an important condition for effective competition 
in network sectors.
4  TPA refers to both the possibility of access and the conditions under 
which the access can take place.  One important condition is the price under which access is 
granted, the access fee.  Much of the literature relates to situations where the upstream 
(network) supplier is vertically integrated with one of the downstream competitors, which is 
not very relevant in the relation between airports and airlines since, as far as known to us, not 
a major airport owns an airline. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical 
derivation of the impact of an identical increase in input cost (airport’s airside service fees) 
on competition in the downstream airline markets. A numerical simulation and results are 
                                                                                                                                                           
related to the supply of aeronautical services and related services at seven major airports: Adelaide, Brisbane, 
Canberra, Darwin, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney airports. 
4 See, for instance Laffont et al. (1998), Lewis and Sappington (1999) and Granderson (2000) 
  4presented in section 3.  The final section concludes and discusses the results.  
 
 
2.   Effects of Airport Charge Increase on Competition in Downstream Airline Market 
 
As airports provide essential inputs to airlines, it follows immediately that when the airport 
charge is increased above socially optimal level (competitive level), air travel volume will be 
reduced below socially optimal level, leading to a social welfare loss.  This issue has been 
extensively studied in the literature of double marginalization and natural monopoly 
regulation.  However, so far the impact of airport charges on downstream airline competition 
has received little attention.  Even less attention has been given to the impacts of changing 
airport charges on the competition between Full Service Airlines (FSAs) and Low Cost 
Carriers (LCCs).  
 
This problem is worth a scrutiny as LCCs’ activities appear to be more sensitive to airport 
charges.  Many LCCs around the world actually started their business by using secondary 
airports taking advantage of their lower airport charges and less congestion.  For example, 
Ryanair could not have achieved such a successful service on the Dublin-London route if 
they had to use Heathrow airport.  Also, it is well known that Southwest starts typically their 
operations at secondary airports in U.S.  It is well known that European LCCs, especially 
Ryanair, drive a hard bargain with airports and local business interests in order to extract best 
charges and service conditions.  Some LCCs are apparently successful in gaining even a 
subsidy from the airport for an initial period of their service initiation.  The agreement 
between Brussel’s Charleroi Airport and Ryanair was under investigation by European 
Commission as the commercial assistance to Ryanair by the airport was accused as 
constituting an illegal state subsidy (Piling, 2003).  Ryanair paid, in average, $1 or less per 
passenger to eight provincial UK airports during the 1998 – 2000 period while the average 
aeronautical revenue at major airports in Europe were above $8 per passenger (Barrett 2004).  
LCCs’ high sensitivity to airport charges is also evidenced by the fact that some LCCs chose 
to abandon a market if they do not get a deep discount on airport charges continuously, as the 
airports seek to recover their investments made during their “promotion” periods.  For 
example, Dublin, London’s Luton airport and Manchester have experienced a reduction in 
LCC services after revising initial low airport changes. (see Francis, Fidato and Humphreys 
(2003) and Barrett (2000)).  All these suggest that LCCs are more sensitive to the terms of 
airport access terms than FSAs.  Meanwhile, LCCs have been credited as a major contributor 
to airline competition and average fare reduction, as documented, for example, in Windle and 
Dresner (1996) and Dresner, Liu and Windle (1999). Understanding the possible differential 
impacts of airport charge on LCCs and FSAs is, therefore, of great importance for airport 
regulators and airline competition policy makers.  
 
Although double marginalization and competition between FSAs under the assumption of 
homogeneous products have already been studied by others, as their results provide a good 
benchmark against which to compare our duopoly results on differentiated products we 
present briefly a duopoly model with homogeneous product in section 2.1 below before 
presenting the differentiated products duopoly model.  
 
  52.1  The benchmark case: Homogeneous Product Duopoly 
Most previous studies on LCC competition have focused on their pricing effects on the 
aviation market without explicitly treating product differentiation between FSA and LCC, an 
important feature of the competition.  This may overlook the differential impacts of a change 
in external condition such as changes in input prices, taxes, security charges, etc.  In this 
section, we will first model duopoly competition when firms offer homogenous products.  
Analytical results obtained will then be used as a benchmark with which to compare the 
results of the differential product duopoly model presented later. 
 
Suppose two firms offer homogenous product to the market with constant marginal costs   
and  , where  . They face the same linear market demand: 
1 c
2 c 0 2 1 > > c c
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where   and  represent two firms’ outputs respectively. Each firm maximizes profit by 
setting its own output, taking into account of the other firm’s reaction. Each firm’s profit 
function can be written as: 
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The first order conditions (FOC) for profit maximization are as follows: 
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v =  denotes the conduct parameter (conjectural variation) of firm i, following 
Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1993).  The conduct parameter is a measure of how firms compete. 
When firms are symmetric, a conduct parameter of 1 corresponds to perfect collusion, a zero 
conduct parameter corresponds to Cournot competition while a conduct parameter of -1 
denotes Betrand competition.  Combining the first order conditions of both firms, we obtain 
the following system of equations (4): 
 
           1 2 1 1 ) 2 ( c a bq v bq − = + +
 ( 4 ) 
         2 2 2 1 ) 2 ( c a v bq bq − = + +  
   
 
solving for equilibrium output for each firm yields: 
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  6It immediately follows that when two firms engage in equally aggressive competition such 
that  , an efficient firm has larger output  v v v = = 2 1 2 1 q q <   and higher profit  2 1 π π < , 
provided that  .  In the special case where  1 − > v 1 − = v , all output is provided by the firm with 
the lowest costs and profits are zero for all other firms. 
 
If the two firms’ marginal costs are increased by the same amount, dc, firm 1’s output will 
change by: 
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And by symmetry for firm 2: 
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Clearly, the denominator of (6) and (7) is positive for all  1 − > v , implying that both firms 
experience an equal amount of output reduction when they are equally aggressive.  As the 
low-cost firm has a higher output level, it faces a proportionally smaller output reduction, 
despite the fact that it faces a proportionally higher unit cost increase than its higher cost 
competitor. 
 
If, on the other hand, conduct parameters differ between the two firms, the picture can 
change.  Suppose, as is most likely the case, that the low cost producer competes more 
aggressively (i.e. ), then it follows from equations (6) and (7) that the 
reduction in output will be larger for the low cost producer ( ).  
1 0 2 1 − ≥ > ≥ v v
2 1 0 dq dq > ≥
 
In summary, when two firms offer homogenous products and engage in equally aggressive 
competition: 
•  The firm with lower cost achieves larger output and higher profit; 
•  When there is an identical increase in marginal costs, firms experience the same 
amount of output reduction, so that the lower cost firm is harmed proportionally less 
in terms of output and profit reduction; and 
•  But, if we introduce differences in the conduct parameters, assuming that the lower 
cost firm is more aggressive in competition, we find that it will experience a larger 
amount of output reduction. 
 
 
2.2  Differentiated Duopoly Competition Model 
Clearly the homogeneous product assumption used above is not realistic for modeling the 
competition between FSA and LCC.   Both FSA and LCC offer multiple products in the 
market.   FSAs typically offer a combination of first class and business class services, full 
fare economy, shallow discount services, and a fair amount of deep discount services.   
Although LCCs are well known for selling cheap deep discount tickets, they also offer 
increasingly flexible services comparable to full economy and shallow discount tickets sold 
by FSA.  As such, FSAs and LCCs may be regarded as offering homogenous products in the 
lower end of the market segments, but overall FSAs offer a superior product compared to 
LCC with higher costs.  Previous studies such as Richards (1996) and Windle and Dresner 
  7(1999) confirm that LCCs in general target more price sensitive travelers with inferior 
services.  
 
To analyze the competition between FSA and LCC by taking into account of their product 
differentiation formally, we utilize a differentiated duopoly model proposed by Dixit (1979) 
and treated further in Singh and Vives (1984).  Throughout this section, we assume firm 1 to 
be the FSA and firm 2 the LCC, both facing following demand system: 
 
2 1 1 1 1 kq q b a p − − =  
(8)    2 2 1 2 2 q b kq a p − − =
 
which corresponds to a representative consumer maximizing a quadratic and strictly concave 





2 2 2 1
2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 q b q kq q b q a q a q q U + + − + = .  Concavity implies that 
.  And the demand function can be rewritten as:  0
2
2 1 > − k b b
 
      ] ) [(
1
2 1 2 2 2 1 2
2 1
1 kp p b k a b a
k b b




      ] ) [(
1
2 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 1
2 p b kp k a b a
k b b




The restriction of positive quantities implies the following constraints: 
 
(10)   and    0 ) ( 2 2 1 > − k a b a 0 ) ( 1 1 2 > − k a b a
 
The stylized demand function can be depicted as in figure 1, based on our empirical 
observation in the aviation market: 
 
 








Since LCCs focus on price-sensitive customers, they face more price-elastic demand.   
Utilizing the fact that, in general, a firm’s price impacts more on their own market output 
  8than on the supply quantity of the substitutes (competitor’s output), we can further impose 
the following constraints to our model: 
 
         2 1 2 1 c c a a > > >
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       0 2 1 > > > k b b
 
Where   and   are firms’ constant marginal costs.  We restrict to the case where two firms 
produce substitutes, implying that  .  If we further restrict to the case where two firms 
can effectively compete with each other, then we can impose   used in (11).   
1 c 2 c
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Assuming that both firms maximize profits by setting output quantities, then the FOC for 
firm 1 may be written as: 
 


























= .  Firm 1 and 2’s FOCs define 
their respective reaction functions, which constitute the following system of equations: 
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When the two firms do not collude in the market
5, we have  0 1 ≤ ≤ − i v , which implies: 
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Note that our earlier restriction that   implies that m>n for all  .  Solving the FOC 
equation systems leads to firms’ equilibrium outputs given each firm’s conduct parameter: 
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5 This refers to the cases when firms engage in competition more aggressively than Cournot.  
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Restrictions in equation (15) ensure that two firms’ reaction functions intersect each other so 
that a unique Nash Equlibrium exists.  This is depicted in the following stylized figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Two Firms’ Reaction Functions Intersect 
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intersect with each firm’s output axis. 
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For clarity of interpretation, solution (14) can be rewritten as follows: 
 






































That is, each firm’s output depends on the degree of product differentiation (as measured by 
k) 
6, firms’ costs and conduct parameter. 
 
As in the previous section, let us look at the effect of an identical increase in marginal costs 
(i.e. ) on both firms’ outputs.  By applying such an identical marginal cost 
increase to the system of equations in (16), we obtain: 






                                                 
6 More precisely, the degree of product differentiation depends on the relative values of k,  and b  in equation 






 may be regarded as a more appropriate measure of product differentiation. 

























































It can be seen that when two firms engage in equally aggressive competition ( v v v = = 2 1 ), 
, which implies that  ) 2 ( ) 2 ( 1 2 kv b m kv b n k + = < + = < 2 1 dq dq < .   This result means that 
when duopoly firms adopt a similar strategy in setting quantity (same conduct parameter), 
then the firm facing less price-elastic demand will end up reducing its output less than its 
competitor (the firm facing higher price-elastic demand).   In our case, when an FSA and an 
LCC engage in equally aggressive competition, the equilibrium passenger volume of LCC 
will be reduced more than that of FSA when an identical increase in marginal cost occurs to 
both firms.  It is important to note that this finding is strengthened if we assume that the LCC 
competes more aggressively than the FSA, implying  1 0 2 1 − ≥ > ≥ v v . 
 
Then, what can we be said about the relative reduction in outputs of the two firms from 
equations (17)? To answer this question, we express equation (17) in relative terms as below: 
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It can easily be shown that  ) ( ) ( 1 1 2 2 c a c a − < −  is a sufficient condition to ensure that the 
LCC’s output is more affected proportionally than the FSA’s output.  
 
As   denotes the constant marginal costs of carrying one additional passenger, whereas   
is the highest evaluation (for the first unit of consumption) for the service, we should have 
, which in general leads to  
i c i a
i i c a >> ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 c c a a − > −  when two firms’ services are fairly 
differentiated.  However, if firm 1 and firm 2 offer almost homogenous product (implying 
), then one can see that the firm with higher marginal cost will lose proportionally 
more output.  This is the same result as observed in the benchmark case treated in section 2.1 
2 1 a a ≈
 
Let us now turn our attention to the effects of the identical cost increase on air fares. With 
each firm’s outputs at the equilibrium, the price of each product can be obtained by 
substituting the equilibrium outputs in equation (14) into the respective demand functions: 
 
























































Each firm’s equilibrium price increase caused by the cost increase   can be written as:  dc
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This means when an identical marginal cost increase occurs, neither firm can fully pass the 
cost increase to passengers. It is intuitively clear from equation (20) that   only 
needs  
2 1 dp dp >
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Which will hold when  , provided that at least one of the two conduct parameters 
exceeds the value of -1.  This suggests that FSAs have greater ability to pass on the cost 
increase to passengers.  
2 1 v v ≤
 
As we have shown thus far, an identical marginal cost increase is likely to harm an LCC 
more than it will harm an FSA, both in terms of output and prices.   Similarly, it can be 
shown that in general, the FSA’s profit will be proportionally less harmed by an identical 
marginal cost increase.  To show this, the two firms’ profit functions can be written as: 
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Therefore, an identical marginal cost increase dcwill change firms’ profit by: 
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Like before,  ) ( ) ( 1 1 2 2 c a c a − < −   is a sufficient condition to ensure that the full service 
airline is proportionally less affected.  However, as we have shown that firms’ positive 
outputs implies the following: 
 
    0 ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 > − − − c a k c a n
    0 ) ( ) ( 1 1 2 2 > − − − c a k c a m
 
From these, it immediately follows that  0 1 < π d  and  0 2 < π d  whenever  .  That is, 
although FSA will be proportionally less harmed by such an identical cost increase, its 
0 > dc
  12profitability will always be reduced.  As such, unless the FSA is sure that such identical cost 
increase will drive the LCC out of the market, it is not in the FSA’s interest to adopt the 
strategy of “Raising Rival’s Cost”, at least not in the form of encouraging an airport to raise 
the user charges it imposed on airlines (in such a way to increase marginal costs of both 
airlines by an identical amount). This may explain why Qantas joined Virgin Blue’s 
declaration application.  Although a price increase by Sydney airport would harm Virgin 
Blue more than it does Qantas (thus creating some competitive advantage for Qantas), it is 
impossible for Virgin Blue to totally abandon services to/from Sydney airport. 
 
Although these results are derived from the assumption that firms have constant marginal 
costs, our general conclusions most likely continue to hold even if fixed costs are also 
considered.  When airlines have fixed costs, their profits will be smaller given the same 
amount of output and price.  Each firm’s reaction function will have the same shape as before, 
but optimal outputs below a certain point now correspond to loss minimization instead of 
profit maximization.  As LCCs typically operate on a route by route case while FSAs often 
consider the overall network effects, it is likely that LCCs will be the first to exit the market 
because its equilibrium outputs and profits more sensitive to an identical increase in airport 
charge.   Of course, empirically this depends on each airline’s existing profitability, cost and 
competition strategy.  
 
In summary, so far we have obtained the following key analytical results when airlines 
compete by offering homogenous products, as in the case when an FSA competes with 
another FSA, or an LCC competes with another LCC, or an FSA competes with an LCC in 
the same market segment: 
 
•  When firms engage in equally aggressive competition, the firm with lower cost will 
achieve larger output and higher profits; 
•  When firms engage in equally aggressive competition, an identical increase in 
marginal cost will punish the high cost airline more as both its output and profit are 
reduced proportionally more; and 
•  A firm adopting a more aggressive competition strategy (manifested by a lower value 
of conduct parameter) will end up reducing its equilibrium output by a larger amount 
when an external shock (e.g., airport user charges) raises both firms’ marginal cost by  
an identical amount. 
 
When airlines engage in differentiated product duopoly, such as in the overall competition 
(as opposed to competition in a particular market segment) between an FSA and an LCC, we 
find that: 
 
•  An identical increase in marginal cost will harm an LCC more than an FSA as the 
former suffers proportionally more reduction of its output and profit than the latter;   
•  Neither the FSA nor the LCC can fully pass on such an external cost increase to 
consumers.  Both firms will suffer a profit loss;   
•  If the LCC competes at least as aggressively as the FSA, an identical marginal cost 
increase would lead the LCC to reduce its output quantity by a larger amount than the 
FSA, and the LCC’s price increase would be lower than that of the FSA.   
 
That is, an identical cost increase will proportionally harm the LCC more as the airline is less 
able to pass on such a cost increase to its price sensitive consumers. Although such an 
identical marginal cost increase, such as per-passenger airport service charge, or government 
  13imposed per-passenger security charge is likely to only constitute a small proportion of the 
total unit costs, its impacts may be non-trivial.  As most airlines are currently operating at 
barely breakeven level, such cost increase will further reduce these airlines’ profitability, 
possibly forcing them to reduce service levels or cease operations on some routes altogether.  
 
We have shown that in theory, although an FSA’s outputs and profits will be less impacted 
negatively by an external factor leading to an identical increase per-passenger marginal cost 
to both FSAs and LCCs (and thus, creating a competitive advantage over an LCC) an FSA 
will not adopt the “Raising Rival’s Cost” strategy by encouraging airports raise airside user 
charges except when it is sure of the LCC’s exit out of the market.   
 
 
3.   A Numerical Example 
This section illustrates the mechanisms described in the previous sections, using a numerical 
example. The parameter values used here mimic a realistic aviation market, but we do not 
pretend to provide any form of empirical proof, nor do they represent any particular city pair 
market. All parameters used here are in accordance with the constraints and assumptions 
described in section 2, and reflect our best estimate based on our understanding of the air 
transport markets, in particular in the markets where an FSA and an LCC compete. 
 
Assumptions: 
We start with the likely values for some of the parameters so that the differentiated duopoly 
model described in section 2.2 can be calibrated.  This base case provides some numerical 
results which enables one to appreciate the differential impacts of an identical marginal cost 
increase on an LCC and an FSA.  Sensitivity tests are used so that we are sure these results 
hold for any reasonable ranges of the parameter values.  The assumptions we made for the 
base case are: 
•  Conduct Parameters: We limit our analysis to non-collusive games, thus limiting 
ourselves to non-positive values for v1 and v2. The base values we choose are 
.  5 . 0 2 1 − = = v v
•  ,  and k: constraint (10) requires  . Parameter k measures how different  
the services provided by the two firms are.   Let  
1 b 2 b k b b > > 2 1
1 b t k ⋅ =  ( ) 1 0 < < t , then if  the 
two firms’ services are not substitutes at all, while  
0 = t
1 = t  indicates that the FSA and 
LCC produce perfectly homogenous services.  In the base case we assume  . 
We also assume 







=  so that constraint (10) is always satisfied. 
•  Market price elasticity for air travel: -1.4. 
•  Each firm’s equilibrium price: Clearly these values serve as a numeraire only. For 
simplicity, we assume FSA’s price at  100 1 = p  while the LCC’s price is assumed to 
be 25% lower, i.e.,  .  75 2 = p
•  Each firm’s equilibrium output: Only the firms’ relative shares matter. We assume 





With the above assumptions, other parameters of the model can be derived as follows: 
•  Market output   .  000 , 100 2 1 = + = q q Q
  14•  Market price  90
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•  : When both firms experience an identical price change  ,  or an 
equivalent market price change of 
1 b dp dp dp = = 2 1
dp dP = , from the demand equation in (9) the total 
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•  Table 1 report the base case values of other parameters that we derived: 
 
Table 1:  Derived Parameter Values for Base Case 
 
Parameters  2 b   1 c   2 c   1 a   2 a   11 e   22 e  
Value  0.00068 68.7  58.9  170.7  136.1 -4.9 -
6.48 
Parameters  k m n  1 π   2 π   12 e   21 e  
Value  0.00056 0.00133 0.00108 1,880,357 642,857 3.02 6.05 
 
Note    are firm’s own price elasticity, while   measures  firm  i’s cross elasticity with 
respect to firm j’s price.  They have the right sign and are within a reasonable range
ii e ij e
7. With 
all of the parameter values, it is straightforward to calculate the impact of an identical 
increase in marginal cost. The results are summarized in table 2.   
 
Table 2.  Changes in Market Equilibrium Caused by Different  
% Increase in Airport Charge 
%Charge 
Increase  50% 100%  150%  200% 250% 300%  350% 400% 450% 500% 
1 % q ∆   -0.4% -0.8% -1.2% -1.6% -1.9% -2.3%  -2.7% -3.1% -3.5% -3.9% 
2 % q ∆   -0.9% -1.7% -2.6% -3.4% -  4.3% -5.1%  -6.0% -6.8% -7.7% -8.5% 
1 % p ∆   0.4% 0.8% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9% 2.3%  2.6% 3.0% 3.4% 3.8% 
2 % p ∆   0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 1.9% 2.4% 2.9%  3.4% 3.9% 4.4% 4.8% 
1 % π ∆   -0.8%  -1.5%  -2.3% -3.1%  -3.8%  -4.6% -5.4% -6.1% -6.9% -7.6% 









P ∆ %   0.4% 0.9% 1.3% 1.8% 2.2% 2.7%  3.1% 3.6% 4.0% 4.5% 
Q ∆ %   -0.6% -1.1% -1.7% -2.3% -2.9% -3.4%  -4.0% -4.6% -5.2% -5.7% 
 
As expected, the reduction in LCC’s profit is larger than that of the FSA, implying 
proportionally larger impacts on the LCC. Although the market price elasticity in the base 
case is only assumed to be -1.4, the corresponding LCC’s firm-specific price elasticity is 
much larger in absolute value ( 48 . 6 22 − = e ).  Together with its low cost, it is not surprising 
that even a moderate increase in airport charge will reduce its profitability significantly.  One 
                                                 
7 Few studies have empirically estimated firm specific elasticity for airlines. Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1993) 
reported that UA and AA’s firm specific elasticities are significantly above market elasticity. In many leisure 
routes the two firms’ firm specific elasticity were as high as around -10.  
  15should note that the LCC’s price for the base case was assumed to be $75.  The reduction in 
airline’s profitability will be more moderate for longer distance (more costly) routes.  In the 
base case, the FSA loses fewer passengers and pass on greater proportion of the price 
increase to passengers.  These are, of course, entirely consist with our analytical results. 
 
There are two major assumptions in our simulation: value of firms’ conduct parameter, and 
parameter t (k) which measures the extent of product differentiation between LCC and FSA. 
Few studies estimated differential conduct parameters empirically using airline data on LCCs 
and FSAs. Haugh and Hazledine (1999) and Hazledine, Green and Haugh (2001) are 
exceptions that we are aware.  Although their studies found that the LCC does behave more 
aggressively in the trans-Tasman market (as evidenced by LCC’s lower conduct parameter), 
they obtained this result based on calibration of their models instead of estimating the model 
parameters empirically from the real data.  Although their finding supports our view that 
LCCs use more aggressive strategies (equivalent to a lower value of conduct parameter) than 
FSAs, it is necessary for us to conduct a sensitivity test on a plausible range of conduct 
parameter values in order to study sensitivity of our results. 
 
First, we fix firm 1’s conduct parameter to -0.5 ( 5 . 0 1 − = v ) and change the value of firm 2’s 
conduct parameter    from 0 to -1, with an interval of 0.1. We calculate all market 
parameters for each pair of the conduct parameters and used to simulate for one unit (100%) 
increase in marginal cost for both carriers.  Such tests are performed for the t value of 0.5 to 
0.9 at an interval of 0.1 so that k takes values in the range of [ ,  ], respectively.
2 v
1 5 . 0 b 1 9 . 0 b
8     





y =  in figure 3.  These 
curves showing the FSA-LSA output reduction ratio are all downward sloping, implying that 
the more aggressive the LCC behaves, the higher will be its loss from an identical marginal 
cost increase relative to the FSA.  Figure 3 shows also that the curve for a higher value of t is 
steeper than the ones for lower t values. This indicates that competition becomes more 
important as products are closer substitutes.  Let us consider the extreme case (not in the 
figure) where the goods are no longer substitutes (i.e. t=0).  In this case, the output reduction 
ratio curve in the figure would become a horizontal line, implying the absence of any effect 




                                                 
8 We did not simulate the case when firms offer perfect homogenous services (t =1) as the assumptions on 
equilibrium outputs and prices for the base case were unreasonable in this case. 
 






























t=0.5 t=0.6 t=0.7 t=0.8 t=0.9
 
 
The corresponding differential changes in two firms’ profits,  1 2 % % π π ∆ − ∆  are plotted as 
in figure 4.  Note that since  i π ∆  is negative for both firms, a positive differential number 
indicates that the LCC suffers more profit reduction proportionally. 
 






























t=0.5 t=0.6 t=0.7 t=0.8 t=0.9
 
 
The profit reduction ratio curves are upward sloping, suggesting that the LCC will suffer 
more from the identical marginal cost increase as the more aggressively it behaves.  Note that 
the curve for a high value of t is steeper than the ones for lower t values.  This reflects again 
that competition becomes more important as products become closer substitutes.  It can be 
  17seen from the graph that when two firms offer fairly close services (t =0.9) while the FSA 
competes much more aggressively than the LCC ( 5 . 0 1 − = v ,  0 2 = v ), it is possible that the 
FSA loses profits proportionally more than the LCC.  This is consistent with our analytical 
results in section 2.1, which indicates when firms compete with homogenous products, a 
more aggressive competitor would be harmed more. 
 
In sum, our numerical simulation and sensitivity tests on key parameters of our differentiated 
product duopoly model demonstrate the reliability of our results within reasonable parameter 
range.  It also gives rough estimated values of the differential effects of an identical marginal 
cost increase (e.g., due to increase in airport’s airside service charges including landing fees) 




4.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
With the worldwide trend of airport privatization and commercialization, the extent and form 
of airport regulation are becoming an important issue for policy makers and regulators.  The 
level of an airport’s user charge affects not only air travel demand and social welfare, but 
also competition in the downstream airline markets to/from that airport.  This latter aspect of 
the effect of airport user charges have been overlooked and thus, have not been incorporated 
in the analysis of airport pricing and regulation.  This paper attempt to fill this void in the 
past literature by showing that the level of competition in the downstream airline markets 
will be reduced when an airport increases its airside service charges (e.g., aircraft landing 
fees) by same amount to all airlines because such increase would reduce equilibrium outputs 
and profits of LCCs proportionally more than those of FSAs. 
 
In section 2, using duopoly models, we have derived the following analytical results: 
•  When two airlines compete with homogenous products, an identical increase in 
airport charge would punish a higher cost airline by reducing its equilibrium output 
and profit proportionally more than those of its competitor.    
•  However, when two airlines compete with differentiated products such as the case 
where an FSA and an LCC compete with each other, the LCC will lose its output and 
profits proportionally more than its FSA competitor.  As a result, such increase in 
airport user charge would harm competition in the downstream airline markets to and 
from that airport. 
•  We have analyzed influences of the extent of product differentiation (substitutability), 
the extent of difference in unit cost levels and the difference in the two firms’ conduct 
parameters on the equilibrium outcomes. For example, when the LCC competes at 
least as aggressively as the FSA, the latter will be able to pass more of its marginal 
cost increase (caused by the increased airport user charges) to consumers in the form 
of air fare increase.  Although an increase in airport’s airside fee can thus increase 
competitive advantage of FSA vis-à-vis LCC, it is still not in the FSA’s interest to 
encourage airports to increase airside user charge in order to take advantage of its 
increasing competitive advantage.    
 
Our numerical simulation and sensitivity tests on key parameters confirmed all of our 
analytical findings.  The simulation experiments further indicated the following empirical 
results: 
  18•  The ratio of FSA’s output reduction relative to LCC’s decreases as LCC’s conduct 
parameter (v2) moves from zero towards -1.  This implies that the more aggressively 
LCC behaves, the higher will be the reduction of its output relative to FSA caused by 
an identical marginal cost increase; 
•  Competition becomes more important as the two firms (FSA and LCC) compete with  
closer substitutes; 
•  The differential amount of profit reduction between LCC and FSA increases as the 
LCC’s conduct parameter (v2) moves from 0 towards -1.0.  This implies that the 
LCC’s profit reduction relative to FSA’s profit reduction will increase as LCC 
behaves progressively more aggressive.    
 
Although in this paper we can not compare our simulation results explicitly with those of 
our work on the Virgin Blue vs. Sydney Airport case before the Australian Competition 
Tribunal because of the confidential nature of the data and results, we are satisfied that our 
simulation results in this paper are very consistent with the aggregate results we obtained 
using the real airline and airport data.  In the Australian work, we obtained the results on the 
duopoly routes to and from Sydney.  On the route markets where average air fares are in the 
range of [$100, $200], we found that a $3 increase in the airport’s airside service charge will 
likely reduce Virgin Blue’s traffic volume by 2%-5%, which is 2 to 3 times of the FSA’s 
simulated traffic reduction.  Our simulation results in this paper and our Australian work 
indicate clearly that an increase in an airport’s user charge will harm LCCs significantly 
more than FSAs, and thereby, impact negatively on the competition in the downstream air 
transport markets.  Therefore, future analysis on airport pricing and price regulation should 
consider this additional welfare loss a monopolistic airport pricing may cause. This is 
especially important when there is no alternative airport in the vicinity to which airlines can 
move their operational bases.  
 
Some economists argue that since the incentives for generating non-aviation revenues 
including concession and car parking revenues would constrain airport management from 
charging monopolistic airside services charges, there is no need to impose any price 
regulation on privatized airports.  However, recently Oum, Zhang and Zhang (2004) have 
shown analytically that the airside service charges of an unregulated profit-maximizing 
airport are higher than those of a public airport under a breakeven budget constraint, even 
after the incentive provided by concession profits is taken into account.  In addition, because 
of the extremely low price elasticity of air travel demand with respect to airports’ user 
charges (Gillen, Oum and Tretheway (1998) report -0.01 to -0.1), any profit-maximizing 
airport management will have incentives raise airside user charges at least several hundred 
percentage points beyond the current levels even after considering effect of the demand 
complementarity between aircraft landing and concession activities. Therefore, the 
governments should consider carefully whether or not they need to impose some sort of price 
regulation on privatized airports.  
 
While we have argued the need for some sort of price regulation on privatized airports, 
we have not treated any types and extent of regulation.  Instead, we pointed out that policy 
makers and regulators need to take into account of the effect of airport pricing on 
competition in the downstream airline market when decisions on price regulation or 
deregulation of privatized airports are considered.  Obviously, further research, especially 
empirical research, on the subject is needed since we were not able to publish the results 
based on real market data.  
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